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Articles 
DEFENDING JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A 
REPLY 
Larry Alexander* 
Frederick Schauer** 
In On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 1 we put 
forth and defended the position that the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of the Constitution should be taken by all other offi-
cials, judicial and non-judicial, as having an authoritative status 
equivalent to the Constitution itself. We argued, to ~ut it 
starkly, that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is" may 
well be bad jurisprudence because it is incomprehensible as an 
attempt to explain what it means to argue to the Supreme 
Court,3 but that it is nonetheless a desirable attitude for non-
judicial officials to have towards the Court and its product, in 
much the same way, but far less controversially, that it is a desir-
able attitude for lower court judges to have towards the Court 
and its opinions.4 
Warren Distinguished Professor of L·tw, University of San Diego School of 
Law. 
•• Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Academic Dean, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. An earlier version of this Essay 
was presented on February 18, 1999, as the James A. Moffett Lecture in Ethics at Prince-
ton University. 
I, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Excrajudicial Conscicuciona/ lmer-
precacion, 110 Harv. L Rev. 1359 (1997). 
2. Charles E. Hughes, Addresses and Papers 139-41 (Knickcrbacker Press, 1908). 
3. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 36-37 (Belknap Press, 1986); H.LA. Hart, 
The Concept of Law 124-54 (2d ed. 1994). 
4. Sec Evan H. Caminker, Why Muse Inferior Courrs Obey Superior Court Prece-
dems?, 46 Stan. L Rev. 817 (1994); Evan H. Caminker, Precedem and Prediccion: The 
Forward-Looking Aspeccs of Inferior Courr Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L Rev. I (1994); 
Frederick Schauer, Precedem, 39 Stan. L Rev. 571 (1987). 
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This position, commonly associated with the Supreme 
Court's opinions in Cooper v. Aaron,5 and, more recently, in City 
of Boerne v. Flores,6 has long been subject to withering criticism. 
Some of this criticism has come from academics,7 but even more 
has come from officials of the executive and legislative branches 
of government who see little reason to take their own interpreta-
tions of the Constitution as being subject to override or nullifica-
tion just because of a prior claim by a branch of government-
the judiciary- that is given no interpretative priority in the con-
stitutional text itself. 8 The raw assertion of judicial supremacy in 
the task of interpreting the Constitution, so the critics of Cooper 
and City of Boerne have insisted, is unsupported by history, un-
5. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
6. 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997) ("When the political branches of the Government act 
against the backg.ound of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it 
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its prece-
dents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and con-
trary expectations must be disappointed."). In important respects, City of Boerne pre-
sents a problem orthogonal to the one that is our primary concern, both here and in our 
earlier Article. City of Boerne is about the circumstances under which Congress, acting 
pursuant to its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, might depart from Su-
preme Court precedent in exercising those powers. The existence of the § 5 power 
makes the question one of substantive interpretation rather than one of obedience, al-
though our arguments for stability and settlement might properly be understood as in 
some tension with the strong exercise of congressional power under § 5. Were the § 5 
power a potentially limited one, this would be of limited moment. But as long as a vast 
range of potential congressional action can potentially be shoe-horned into the § 5 
power, then it follows that our arguments provide substantial support for at least as much 
of the City of Boerne outcome as rejects the use by Congress of the § 5 power to directly 
repudiate what the Supreme Court has already determined. Although Justice Kennedy 
did say in City of Boerne that Congress "has not just the right but the duty to make its 
own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution," 521 U.S. at 535, 
it is this statement and not the outcome that is the troubling part of the opinion. To us, 
Justice Kennedy was merely being polite to Congress, telling a judicial social lie equiva-
lent to complimenting losing counsel on the quality of her argument. 
7. See e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 27-53 (Princeton U. Press, 
1988); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, 24 Hast. Const. L.Q. 359 (1997); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This 
Time?, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1071 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpreta-
tion: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 163 (1997); Robert F. 
Nagel, Name-Calling and the Clear Error Rule, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 193 (1993); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the Courts: A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 437 (1992). 
8. Among the most prominent of modern statements to this effect is Edwin Meese 
III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979 (1987). A substantially identical po-
sition, however, undergirded Abraham Lincoln's refusal to take the Dred Scou decision 
(Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)) as universally binding. Roy P. 
Basler, ed., 3 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 1-76, 102-86,207-325 (Rutgers U. 
Press, 1953). And of course the same view generated a large part of the ·•nullification" 
position that produced Cooper itself. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the 
Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387. 
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supported by the structure of our own constitutional system, and 
unsupported by persuasive normative arguments of political 
theory or institutional design.9 
That Cooper and City of Boerne announce the supremacy of 
the Supreme Court and its interpretations of the Constitution is 
largely beside the point, for the Supreme Court's bald assertion 
of its own interpretive supremacy begs the question whether 
other branches and other officials, to say nothing of the fublic at 
large, should accept the consequences of that assertion.' Never-
theless, and without relying on the bootstrapping argument that 
the Supreme Court's assertion of its own supremacy establishes 
that supremacy, we argued that a central moral function of law is 
to settle what ought to be done. A constitution, because of the 
difficulty of altering it, attempts to effect a more permanent set-
tlement of what ought to be done than do statutes and common 
law decisions. Where the meaning of a legal settlement, includ-
ing a constitutional one, is itself controverted, it is a central 
moral function of judicial interpretation to settle the meaning of 
that (attempted) settlement. The undeniable fact that a judicial 
interpretation of an attempted legal settlement may be incorrect 
does not and should not call into question its authority, for it is 
inherent in all legal settlements of what ought to be done that 
such settlements claim authority even if those subject to them 
believe the settlements to be morally and legally mistaken.'' 
Moreover, the authority of a mistaken second-order settlement 
of the meaning of a first-order settlement of some moral ques-
tion is less problematic than the authority of the first-order set-
tlement itself. So if we expect people to obey the Constitution 
9. For a recapitulation of the debate, and an argument for a narrow reading of 
what Cooper stands for, sec Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American ConstilUtional Law 254-58 
(Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000). 
I 0. See Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Execwive Power of Constitu-
tional Imerpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1293-94 (1996). 
II. To say that settlements claim authority is to say that they purport to provide 
content-independent reasons for action, that is, reasons that arc independent of the 
moral or interpretive correctness of the settlements. Typically, but not exclusively, con-
tent-independent reasons for action, such as the reasons to follow rules and the reasons 
to follow precedent. are a function of the balance of errors committed ova time by sub-
jects' taking the settlements as conclusive of what ought to be done as compared to those 
same subjects acting on their independent substantive and content-based judgments in 
each case. On this conception of authority generally, sec H.L.A. Hart, Commands and 
Authoritative Legal Reasons, in Essays on Bemham: Swdies in Jurisprudence and Political 
Theory 243-68 (Clarendon Press, 1982); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on 
Law and Morality (Clarendon Press, 1979); Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A 
Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 128-34 
(Clarendon Press, 1991 ). 
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even when they morally disagree with it, we can, for the same 
reasons but at one remove, expect them to obey the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Constitution even when they be-
lieve that interpretation to be erroneous. 
Perhaps gratifyingly, our article has in the past three years 
become the target for many of those who take the central claims 
of Cooper and City of Boerne, and the claims of judicial interpre-
tive supremacy more generally, to be misguided. In half a dozen 
extended published responses, 12 and additional commentary con-
tained in less targeted books and articles, 13 we have been seen as 
ahistorical defenders of Supreme Court arrogance, and equally 
ahistorical denigrators of the constitutional interpretive capabili-
ties of Congress and the executive branch. To our critics, our 
claims of judicial supremacy represent ignorance of history, bad 
constitutional law, misguided institutional design, and impover-
ished democratic theory. 
These criticisms have been thoughtful and troubling, but 
our aim here is not to engage in the kind of acrimonious debates 
between critics and "misunderstood" authors that one normally 
associates with the letters section of the New York Review of 
Books. Rather, we take the existence of this volume of criticism 
as an occasion for joining issue, and continuing a debate that 
goes to the central questions of the role of a constitution and the 
role of the courts in a democratic society. 
12. See Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 
84 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998); Edward Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opin-
ion, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123 (1999); Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settle-
ment Function, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 849 (1998); Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Con-
stitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a New Agenda for Research, 16 
Const. Comm. 63 (1999); Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander 
and Schauer, 15 Const. Comm. 65 (1998); Mark Tushnct, Two Versions of Judicial Su-
premacy, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 945 (1998); see also John Harrison, Coordination, the 
Constitution, and the Binding Effect of Judicial Opinions, University of Virginia School of 
Law Working Papers. 
13. Sec Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 27-29 (Prince-
ton U. Press, 1999); William G. Buss, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Demise 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 391, 429-31 (1998); Joel K. 
Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Reflections, 43 St. L. 
L.J. 791, 818-19, 833-35 (1999); Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Base-
line Question, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 865,903-05 (1998). 
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I. THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION 
A. THE PRECONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTION 
An essential preliminary is to consider the nature of the 
question we are asking when we ask whether the Supreme Court 
should be the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, its inter-
pretations consequently binding on others even when their own 
interpretations strike them as better than the Supreme Court's. 
Even before we ask what the question is, we must ask what kind 
of question it is we are asking. 
We frame the preliminary question in this way to make 
clear that we are not asking a question that can be answered 
from the Constitution itself. John Harrison, Edward Hartnett, 
Neal Devins, and Louis Fisher all devote considerable attention 
to the way in which we have ignored the non-designation of the 
Supreme Court as supreme interpreter in the Constitution itself 
as a dispositive datum, and have ignored as well the constitu-
tional history explaining and supporting the view that the Con-
stitution does not and was not intended to grant the Supreme 
Court supreme interpretive power over the Constitution's 
terms. 14 
We accept for the sake of argument (and also because we 
have no reason to doubt it) the rich historical evidence that Har-
rison, Hartnett, Devins, and Fisher have adduced. We thus ac-
cept that the Framers did not intend the Supreme Court to be 
the Constitution's supreme interpreter, that the ratifiers in the 
states did not understand the Supreme Court to be the Constitu-
tion's supreme interpreter, and that the text does not designate 
the Supreme Court as the Constitution's supreme interpreter. 
Consequently, we accept that such a role for the Supreme Court 
cannot itself be based on the Constitution textually or histori-
cally understood. Indeed, we shall go even further and assume, 
for the sake of argument, that the Constitution actually repudi-
ates such a role. But we nevertheless maintain that our argu-
ment is not simply one about hypothetical systems, but one that 
pertains to this Constitution in this constitutional system. 
We are able to make this claim, even with the assumptions 
we accept, because we are arguing for a preconstitutional norm, 
14. Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L. Rev. at 85-90 (cited in note 12); Harrison, Coordi-
nation, the Constitution, and the Binding Effect of Judicial Opinions at 12-20 (cited in 
note 12); Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 120-36 (cited in note 12). 
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a norm that determines not what was adopted then, but how 
what was adopted then should be regarded now. The Constitu-
tion's authority-its status as fundamental law-ultimately rests 
not on facts about the past, but on the Constitution's acceptance 
as authoritative in the present. This is a logical and not a histori-
cal point, and it is a logical point that undergirds our entire ap-
proach.15 
To explain this point, which has eluded our more histori-
cally oriented critics, let us suppose, counterfactually, that the 
Constitution did purport to answer the question of interpretive 
supremacy. That is, suppose that Article VI's Supremacy Clause 
did not say simply and inscrutably that "This Constitution ... 
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in Every 
State shall be bound thereby ... ," but instead provided that 
"This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of the Land, and 
the interpretations of this Constitution by the Supreme Court of 
the United States shall be final and binding on all other judges of 
the United States, on all Judges in the several States, on all Offi-
cials of the Executive and Legislative Branches of this Govern-
ment, and on all Officials of each of the several States." 
Even were this to be the actual text of the Constitution, the 
question of judicial supremacy would still remain open. Even 
were this the constitutional text, there would still be the question 
of who would interpret this provision, and whether that interpre-
tation would be binding on others. Whether one puts this in 
terms of the Wittgensteinian commonplace that rules do not de-
termine their own application, 16 or instead in terms of a Kel-
senian grundnorm 17 or H. L.A. Hart's ultimate rule of recogni-
15. For a fuller t:xploration of this idea in a widt:r range of contt:xts, set: Frank I. 
Michclman, Comtiwtional Authorship by the People, 74 Notre Damt: L. Rev. 1605 
(1999). 
16. To usc Wittgcnstcin"s useful metaphor, when we see a sign that is an arrow, how 
do we know whether to go in the direction of the point or in the direction of the tail? 
Ludwig Wittgenstcin, Philosophical Investigations 'I 85 (Macmillan, 3d cd. G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 1958); Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary 
Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations" 33-34 (Basil Blackwell, 2d ed. 1969). For an 
application of these themes to various jurisprudential questions, see Dennis M. Patter-
son, ed., Wiugenstein and Legal Theory (Westview Press, 1992). 
17. According to Kclsen, a constitution "is grounded as valid by the presupposed 
basic norm." Hans Kelsen, The Function of a Comtitution (lain Stewart trans.), in Rich-
ard Tur and William Twining cds., Essays on Kelsen 109, 119 (Clarendon Press, 1986). 
On the grundnorm more generally, sec Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 3-23 (Max 
Kinght trans., 1967); George C. Christie, The Notion of Validity in Modem Jurisprudence, 
48 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1964); J.W. Harris, When and Why does the Grundnorm Change?, 
29 Cam b. L.J. 103 (1971 ); 1 ulius Stont:, Mystery and Mystique in the Basic Norm, 26 Mod. 
L. Rev. 34 (1963). Sec also Michelman, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1611-19 (cited in note 
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tion, 18 the central point is that the status of a legal text cannot ul-
timately, and cannot without infinite regress, be determined by 
that text itself. In order to determine a text's status we must go 
outside it. And because the text cannot answer the question of 
whether the text is authoritative, neither can it answer the ques-
tion whether someone's interpretation of that text, including that 
part of the text that purports to designate an authoritative inter-
preter, is authoritative. 
In many respects this point is more formal than real, at least 
as applied to our fictional text. The formal logical point we 
make would also apply to the question whether the word "two" 
in Article III, section 3, providing that "[n]o person shall be con-
victed of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to 
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court," 19 should in 
that context refer to the number 3 and not to the number 2. In a 
strictly logical sense, we could understand "two" to refer to 3, for 
the text itself cannot determine whether for the purposes of that 
text it shall be understood as ordinary English, in which "two" 
stands for 2, or as Conglish, say, in which "two" stands for 3.20 
No degree of textual specificity, therefore, can hope to avoid the 
logical necessity of leaving the text in order to establish the prin-
ciples of that text's interpretation. Nevertheless, we might say 
that understanding the Constitution as ordinary English is itself 
a firmly entrenched and widely accepted preconstitutional un-
derstanding, such that interpreting "two" to mean 3 would vio-
late one of the most firmly established of preconstitutional rules. 
Yet even on our fictional example, the point is more real 
than it may at first appear. Interpreting the constitutional text as 
ordinary English turns out not to be as clear a preconstitutional 
rule as we might have supposed, for there are parts of our actual 
constitutional text that have been interpreted in plainly counter-
textual ways, as with, for example, interpreting "another State" 
in the Eleventh Amendment to include the same state,21 and 
perhaps, at least according to Justice Stevens, as with the provi-
15) (discussing American constitutional context). 
18. Hart, The Concept of Law at 100-23 (cited in note 3). For application of the 
idea to the American Constitution and irs foundations, see Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of 
Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987). 
19. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 3, cl. I. 
20. The example is a variation on themes most famously developed in Saul A. 
Kripkc, Wiugenstein on Rules and Private Language 7-54 (Harvard U. Press, 1982). 
21. Sec Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890). For discussion, see Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989). 
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sion prohibiting states from "impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts."22 Consequently, since such generally accepted textual 
affronts (or judicial amendments) have been understood to be 
consistent with the persistence of the remainder of the text it-
self,23 it would not be illogical for our fictional textual provision 
to be interpreted as supporting less judicial interpretive suprem-
acy than the plain language of that text appears to indicate. And 
if such a textual modification, as with the textual modification of 
the Eleventh Amendment, would be logically and empirically 
consistent with the persistence of the balance of the text of the 
Constitution, it becomes clear that even textual clarity does not 
preclude a position at odds with what the provision appears to 
say, and thus leaves open the extra-textual question of whether 
the fictional text should be interpreted as it reads, or instead 
should be interpreted to allow more interpretive power to bodies 
other than the Supreme Court. What counts as law is deter-
mined extra-legally, and what counts as the constitution is de-
termined extra-constitutionally, and so the question whether 
something derogating from what the text appears to say is never-
theless to be considered as legally valid is not a question that can 
be answered by a recursive reference to the text itself. 
Once we comprehend this point in the extreme context of 
the fictional provision set out above, then the a fortiori argument 
with respect to the actual text becomes apparent. If even such a 
clear designation of judicial supremacy would leave logically 
open the question of judicial supremacy, then the question of ju-
dicial supremacy is most certainly an open question on the Con-
stitution we actually have, one in which neither the power of ju-
dicial review itself4 nor the question of the judiciary's 
interpretive authority are addressed at all. On the Constitution 
we do have, the question of who should interpret it, and the 
status others should grant to those interpretations, remains stun-
ningly open. 
The foregoing explains why we refer to the question we ask 
as preconstitutional, in the logical rather than the temporal 
22. "Unlike other provisions, ... it is well settled that the prohibition against im-
pairing the obligation of contracts is not to be read literally." Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,502 (1987). 
23. To put it differently, no one understands these contradictions of the text as re-
pealing or even replacing the entire Constitution of which the judicially repealed provi-
sions arc a part. 
24. Sec John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Re-
view, 84 Va. L. Rev. 333 (1998); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893). 
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sense.25 Questions of how we are to read the constitutional text 
loom outside of and are therefore logically antecedent to the 
constitutional text, for these are questions that in the final analy-
sis determine what the text is to mean. Indeed, because the pre-
constitutional questions are essential for constituting not only a 
nation but also a constitution, there is an important sense in 
which the preconstitutional questions are constitutive and thus 
constitutional. To understand the capital "C" Constitution, we 
must first, and even more importantly, understand the small "c" 
constitution on whose foundation the capital "C" Constitution 
rests.26 And because the question of whose interpretations of 
the text are to be taken as authoritative is especially important 
with respect to a text that is both old and often linguistically in-
determinate, the preconstitutional question of interpretive su-
premacy strikes us, and indeed many others, as being the most 
important of a larger array of preconstitutional questions. 
It is for these reasons that we take the illuminating historical 
and textual analyses of Devins, Fisher, Hartnett, and Harrison to 
be far less conclusive than they take them to be. The question of 
how we are to ground the Constitution is preconstitutional and 
extraconstitutional, and so the question of how we are to under-
stand the Constitution is likewise preconstitutional and extra-
constitutional. Our inquiry into whose interpretations, if any-
one's, of the Constitution are to be regarded as authoritative and 
supreme is just this kind of preconstitutional and extraconstitu-
tional inquiry, and thus a historical or textual focus strikes us as 
missing the point. If when asked why we drive in the direction of 
the tip of the arrow and not the tail we were to respond that the 
arrow tells us to go in the direction of its tip, we would be right-
fully accused of failing to understand the conditions, external to 
the arrow itself, that enable us to understand what the arrow 
means. Similarly, to say that we should look conclusively to the 
Constitution's text and history to determine what that text and 
history are to tell us is to make the same conceptual error. Our 
inquiry is into the conditions that determine what the Constitu-
tion is to be understood as meaning, and it will be of no help to 
presuppose a meaning as a way of answering the question of 
what the meaning is. 
25. Sec RichardS. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 187 (IY81). 
26. Sec Michclman, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. at llil7-18 (cited in note.: 15); Frederick 
Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitlllion, in Sanford Levinson, cd., Re-
sponding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 145 
(1995). 
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B. THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY 
Devins, Fisher, Hartnett, and Harrison show that not every-
one agrees with us about the preconstitutional nature of the in-
quiry, but the more substantial disagreement comes once we 
turn to the nature of the analysis, or the nature of the evidence, 
that we would use to answer the preconstitutional question 
about interpretive supremacy. Once we put aside the unhelp-
fully self-referencing possibility that we should look to the Con-
stitution itself, where should we look for guidance in answering 
the question about interpretive authority? 
Perhaps too casually, we announced in On Extrajudicial 
Constitution Interpretation that our inquiry and analysis was 
"neither empirical nor historical."27 Although accurate as a de-
scription of what we were doing, in the sense of focusing on logi-
cal and philosophical questions of institutional design, the claim 
has puzzled many of our critics, who ask, rightfully, whether the 
inquiry can be as non-empirical as we claimed it was. Upon fur-
ther thought, it is clear to us that the empirical dimension is one 
that cannot be avoided. Moreover, there is no reason why his-
tory might not be one, although only one, component of such an 
empirical inquiry. This does not change the nature of our claim 
or the evidence we would use, then and now, to support it, but it 
does lead us to regret the language we used to describe it, and to 
regret suggesting that questions of institutional design can be an-
swered in an empirical vacuum. 
In describing the inquiry as non-historical, we meant to 
claim, and still mean to claim, that reliance on the authority of 
history to answer the preconstitutional question has the same 
status as relying on the constitutional text, and is thus ultimately 
question-begging. Suppose we were to discover that all fifty-five 
members of the constitutional convention, as well as a majority 
of all of the legislatures of the ratifying states, had understood 
the actual language of Articles III and VI as referring to inter-
pretive exclusivity and interpretive supremacy on the part of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. In that case, it would be 
safe to say that James Madison and his compatriots agreed with 
our claim, but we would nevertheless expressly forego reliance 
on the proposition that what Madison thought settles the ques-
tion. 
27. Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1369 (cited in note 1). 
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That what Madison and others thought does not settle the 
question is premised, again, on the problem of self-reference. 
Suppose, to vary slightly an example that one of us has used pre-
viously,28 that we were to write a constitution establishing us-
Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer-as its supreme interpreters, 
and suppose we were to provide in this document that it would 
become valid and effective upon our signing of it29 and upon no-
tice of that signing appearing, as it now is with these very words, 
in Constitutional Commentary. Under these circumstances, our 
constitution's own internally specified conditions for its validity 
would have been satisfied, and thus our constitution's own claim 
to be the Constitution of the United States would be valid ac-
cording to the conditions contained within the document. 
As should be clear, however, the satisfaction of the docu-
ment's internal and self-specified conditions for its own validity 
would be woefully inadequate to establish the document as the 
Constitution of the United States. And that is because a consti-
tution's status as the constitution is dependent upon its (empiri-
cal) acceptance by a polity as their constitution. Without this 
empirical acceptance-acceptance as social fact-no amount of 
formal internal validity will make a document a constitution. 
What follows from this is that what makes James Madison's 
constitution and not Alexander and Schauer's constitution the 
Constitution of the United States is not something that is con-
tained in the document, and not something that could have been 
determined in 1787, but is rather something that is determined 
now by the American people. Without the social fact of accep-
tance by the American people in 2000 that the document that 
Madison and his compatriots wrote in 1787 is the Constitution of 
the United States, that document is no more authoritative than 
the constitution that we purported to make effective on the 
pages of this volume. 
If what makes the 1787 Constitution the 2000 Constitution 
is dependent on 2000 social facts, then so is the 2000 status of 
what James Madison and the other framers intended in 1787 de-
pendent on a 2000 decision and not on a 1787 decision. The 
relevance of history is not determined historically, but by a pre-
sent political and social decision. As a consequence, the deter-
mination of 1787 preconstitutional questions is necessarily a non-
28. Schauer, Amending the Presuppositiom of a Constitwion at 146-47 (citt.:d in nott.: 
26). 
29. Wt.: signed it. 
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historical question, although it is of course possible that the non-
historical question might be answered by giving a role to history. 
This is the sense in which we claimed that our inquiry was 
not historical. What Madison thought about the question of ju-
dicial supremacy, if indeed he thought about it at all, is no more 
dispositive than what the text says about judicial supremacy, for 
the point about preconstitutionality is as germane to the ques-
tion of the authority of history as it is to the authority of the text. 
Thus, our argument is that the Cooper rule is normatively supe-
rior to what we tendentiously call institutional anarchy. If the 
original Constitution lacks the Cooper rule, then our claim is 
that the original Constitution is normatively inferior to a consti-
tution that contains the Cooper rule. We could, of course, obtain 
the Cooper rule by amending the Constitution through the for-
mal processes it prescribes in Article V. But that is not what we 
are advocating. Rather, we are advocating that we obtain the 
Cooper rule (or recognize the existence and validity of the Coo-
per rule) in the same way that we have obtained the original 
Constitution itself, namely, by accepting it as authoritative. In 
Cooper, the Supreme Court ran that rule up the flagpole. If we 
like it, all we have to do is salute. And it appears that most of us 
have in fact done so. And if that is so, then that makes the Coo-
per rule as "constitutional" as the Constitution itself. 
But if we step back a bit and address the question whether 
we as a society ought to salute-to extend our metaphor perhaps 
beyond the breaking point-then we admit that we were perhaps 
too quick in dismissing the value of history. That history is not 
authoritative does not make it non-authoritatively irrelevant. 
Madison and the other framers were smart fellows, and we have 
much to learn from them, just as we have much to learn from 
Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Abra-
ham Lincoln, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, John Rawls, and Freder-
ick Douglass. And we have much to learn from the history of 
the United States, just as we have much, in the United States, to 
learn from the history of France, Japan, India, Brazil, and South 
Africa. But the central point is that what we learn from history 
we learn because of its content and not because of its authority. 
That Madison said something ought to be relevant to our in-
quiry, but it does not come close to settling the question. 
Because our preconstitutional question is a question of 
normative institutional design-of what institutional designs 
ought to be adopted-it would be a mistake to suppose that we 
could or should engage in this inquiry without reference to facts 
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about the world. To claim that our inquiry is not empirical was 
also then and is now a mistake. Rather, the proper claim is that 
the status of the question- its preconstitutional nature- is itself 
a logical and not a historical or empirical matter. But once the 
status of the question is established, and we are then trying to 
determine whether this or that institutional design is better, it 
would be folly to ignore the evidence that we might obtain from 
the external world, including evidence that we might get from 
history. While inferring that certain sorts of behavior would 
likely flow from certain incentives and systemic designs is en-
tirely appropriate, we recognize that we should never lose sight 
of the fact that these are empirical inferences, and thus usefully 
supplemented by and tested against actual evidence of actual 
behavior, whether that evidence be historical, sociological, statis-
tical, psychological, or otherwise. 
II. THE SETTLEMENT FUNCTION AND ITS OPTIMAL 
LOCATION 
A. IS SEITLEMENT OVERRATED? 
Once we turn from meta-questions about the nature of the 
question to the question itself, we arrive at our claim that one of 
the chief functions of law in general, and constitutional law in 
particular, is to provide a degree of coordinated settlement for 
settlement's sake of what is to be done. In a world of moral and 
political disagreement, law can often provide a settlement of 
these disagreements, a settlement neither final nor conclusive, 
but nevertheless authoritative and thus providing for those in 
first-order disagreement a second-order resolution of that dis-
agreement that will make it possible for decision to be made, ac-
tions to be coordinated, and life to go on. 
But what is so special about settlement? Here our critics 
come in two varieties. Some, especially Mark Tushnet but most 
of the others as well, and indeed a vast tradition surrounding 
them,30 sees an independent virtue in public constitutional dis-
30. In describing a huge modern tradition advocating connecting American consti-
tutional law with an argued desirable public discourse (or dialogue, or deliberation, or 
conversation) about constitutional matters, we could reference literally thousands of 
books and articles. Among the more prominent or exemplary arc Bruce Ackerman, We 
the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991); Levinson, Constitutional Faith (cited in 
note 7); Cass R. Sunstcin, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993); Robert 
Justin Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism and the Art of 
Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 69 (1991); Frank I. Michelman, The Su-
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course, and thus sees a virtue in the kind of discourse that will 
never come to pass without some degree of continuous public 
dispute and debate about constitutional meaning. For an entire 
contemporary movement stressing the Constitution as a forum 
and a focal point for public deliberation, a cardinal virtue of the 
Constitution is that it provides the locus for desirable public de-
bate about crime control, affirmative action, gender equality, 
sexual orientation, devolution of authority to the states, presi-
dential conduct, the role of religion in public life, and innumer-
able other topics that combine undeniable public interest and 
importance with a plain connection to the kinds of topics that 
the Constitution designates as fundamental. And if we overly 
stress the settlement function of the Constitution, so the argu-
ment appears to go, we truncate precisely the public debate and 
deliberation that lies, or should lie, at the heart of the constitu-
tional tradition. 
We demur. Although we do not deny31 the virtues of public 
discourse, it strikes us as the conceit of American constitutional-
ists to think that Americans need the Constitution in order to 
debate affirmative action, criminal justice, abortion, religion and 
the state, privacy, or capital punishment. These debates have 
flourished in countries in which there is no single written consti-
tutional document (primarily Great Britain, New Zealand, and 
Israel),32 and they have flourished in countries in which the writ-
ten constitutions have not constitutionalized these particular 
topics. 33 Although it would take serious comparative delibera-
tive research, using various dimensions of constitutionalism as 
variables, to answer this question with any authority, and al-
though such research does not yet exist, it appears to us far from 
certain that a constitution is either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition, or even a significant causal contributor, to fruitful 
public debate about matters of great political and moral mo-
ment. 
To put the point differently, our argument is premised not 
on the assumptions that agreement is better than disagreement, 
preme Court. 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Governmelll, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 
(1986); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987). 
31. At least here. Sec Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1309 (1997). 
32. See generally S.E. Finer, Vernon Bogdanor, and Bernard Rudden, Comparing 
Constitutions (1995); Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tushnct, Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Foundation Press, 1999). 
33. Sec JohnS. Bell, French Constitutional Law (Clarendon Pn.:ss, 1992). 
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or that settlement is better than keeping things open, even 
though both of these are plausible world-views. Rather, our ar-
gument is premised on the special functions that law serves, and 
that agreement and settlement appear to be the peculiar and 
special province of law, and the peculiar and special province of 
constitutions that have been written down and understood in 
substantially law-like ways. There are other forms of discourse-
focusing public documents, but our argument is premised on 
there being something important about the difference between 
the American Constitution and the writings of Confucius or 
Chairman Mao (to take two prominent examples of discourse-
focusing non-legal documents), and about the difference be-
tween the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.34 
Moreover, although constitutions typically deal with matters 
of greater moral moment than determining whether people 
should drive on the right or on the left, to take the classic exam-
ple of law's coordinating function, the value of settlement for 
settlement's sake is hardly absent from the functions of a consti-
tution. Although people could well have serious moral and po-
litical disagreements about whether to have proportional or 
"first past the post" representation, about whether there should 
be an established state religion, about whether there should be 
trial by jury in civil (or criminal) cases, about whether criminal 
defendants should be compelled (upon pain of punishment for 
contempt of court, or a permissible inference of guilt to testify), 
or about whether Presidents should serve as many four-year 
terms as the electorate is willing to permit, all of these areas of 
plausible political and moral disagreement are pretty much set-
tled in the American constitutional text, thus taking them off the 
agenda, even for those who disagree with the substance of the 
settlement. The authority of law, when it is taken to be authori-
tative, provides, for those who disagree with the terms of the set-
tlement, content-independent reason for obeying the terms of 
34. We intentionally usc the latter example because Mark Tushnet, especially in 
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (cited in note 13), makes 
special reference to the Preamble to the Constitution and to the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, notoriously non-legal documents, as for him the desirable focal points for pub-
lic discourse about foundational values. The examples he wisely picks are consistent with 
a non-legal focus on constitutionalism, but for us the question remains about whether it is 
wise or useful to contlate the question of public debate about matters of great impor-
tance with the question of constitutionalism. If the two arc the same, then Tushnct is 
right and we arc wrong. If the two arc different, then the difference must lie somewhere 
outside of the realm of public discourse, and instead in the realm of constraints on that 
discourse, or constraints on the products of that discourse. 
470 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.17:455 
the settlement even when they disagree with their substance.35 
If, as Justice Brandeis claimed, "in most matters it is more im-
portant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be 
settled right, "36 the settlement qua settlement serves important 
social functions. And as the examples we just gave illustrate, the 
value of settlement for settlement's sake is hardly absent from 
the realm of constitutional settlements. Although the argument 
has been made that the stability wrought by strong ~recedential 
constraint is less important in constitutional context, 7 the text of 
the Constitution itself is strong testimony for Brandeis's view, 
and for the proposition that the constraints of settlement for set-
tlement's sake are often thought, and were thought by the Con-
stitution's drafters, to be more valuable than the value that 
comes from greater flexibility in the face of changing facts about 
the world, and changing views about how we wish to confront 
those facts. 
The examples we have just used, of course, represent a bi-
ased sample, for they are all examples in which the constitutional 
text makes moderately clear what the settlement is. With a text 
as indeterminate as the American Constitution, however, it is far 
more common to find disputes with a constitutional dimension in 
which the text itself provides no settlement for that dispute. 
Does the establishment clause prohibit teacher-organized non-
denominational prayer in the public schools38 or student-led 
non-denominational prayer at public school graduations?39 
Does the equal protection clause prohibit states from maintain-
35. We do not know what to make of Edward Hartnett's claim that we arc in some 
way against disagreement, and that urging obedience is tantamount to condemning dis-
agreement. Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 152-60 (cited in note 12). Nagel also suggests 
the same thing, although more obliquely. Nagel, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 660 (cited in 
note 12). Perhaps we encouraged their misunderstanding by using the ambiguous words 
"without regard." Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 1380 (cited in note 1). 
Yet just as we can drive at 55 miles per hour while loudly and publicly condemning any 
speed limit below 70, so too can public disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpre-
tations of the Constitution be understood as entirely compatible with obedience to those 
interpretations unless and until the Court changes its mind. 
36. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); sec also Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Yes. 481, 497, 32 Eng. Rep. 441, 447 (1803) 
("better the Law should be certain, than that every Judge should speculate upon im-
provements"). . 
37. Sec Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); Payne~·. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,828 (1991); Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: 
Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 401 (1988). 
See generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedellt, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989). 
38. Sec Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington Sch. Disc. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
39. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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ing single-sex colleges and universities?40 Does the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement prohibit use at trial of pro-
bative evidence obtained without a warrant?41 Does the free 
speech clause encompass speech explicitly encouraging racial 
violence?42 Is capital punishment cruel and unusual, and thus 
violative of the Eighth Amendment?43 In the absence of explicit 
congressional action, may states impose regulations that impose 
a financial or logistical burden on interstate commerce?44 Do 
the exigencies of modern legislative practice allow Congress t~ 
delegate legislative responsibilities to administrative agencies,4' 
or to truncate the formal process of two-house approval and pre-
sentment to the President?46 
In these and countless other instances, there exists in the 
United States plausible moral and political disagreement and the 
absence of a clear textual settlement. In place of this textual set-
tlement, however, we have Supreme Court opinions attempting 
to resolve the issue, but whose resolutions certainly do not 
eliminate the underlying disagreement. In such cases, our cen-
tral claim is that the value of settlement for settlement's sake is 
such that bodies other than the Supreme Court, especially lower 
courts, state legislatures, Congress, and the President, ought to 
take the resolution as authoritative even as these bodies con-
tinue to disagree with the substance of the resolution. By recog-
nizing the authority and thus the interpretive supremacy of the 
Supreme Court, we argue, these other bodies will contribute to 
stability and social harmony in just the same way that they do 
when they recognize the authoritative and supremacy of the con-
stitutional text itself. If Bill Clinton recognizes the value of set-
tlement in deferring to the authority of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment in refusing to run for a third term, then so too, we 
argue, should he recognize the value of settlement in refusing to 
sign, for example, a Communications Decency Act explicitly 
contravening a recent and unanimous Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment. 47 If the argument from settlement 
40. Sec Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); United Stales v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
41. Sec Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
42. Sec Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
43. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
44. Sec Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
45. Sec Mistreua v. United Stales, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. 
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
46. Sec INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
47. Compare Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), with Sable Communicalions v. 
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fails, then it is hard to explain most of the Constitution. But if 
the argument from settlement succeeds, then it is an argument 
that supports the existence of a single authoritative interpreter 
as strongly as it supports a single authoritative Constitution. 
Although Tushnet takes the strongest position against treat-
ing law-based settlement as a transcendent value,48 Bruce Pea-
body also takes us to task for overemphasizing it. 49 And al-
though Peabody acknowledges some of our qualifications, he 
still insists that our celebration of settlement and stability slights 
numerous other important values, some of which are substantive 
and some of which are procedural, and which include such wor-
thy goals as creativity and the need to retain flexibility in order 
to be able to rapidly accommodate to a changing world. 50 
Implicit in our argument, however, is something we should 
make explicit-we do not believe that law, or courts, or constitu-
tions, are or should be the repositories for all that is good in in-
stitutional design. Just as we ought not to design the brakes on a 
car in order to maximize speed, acceleration, or ease of steering, 
even as we recognize these other goals as relevant, so too do we 
rely on the proposition that law-based institutions serve stability 
and settlement fostering functions more than do other social in-
stitutions, and that that is not necessarily a bad way to think 
about the separation of functions in a complex and differentiated 
FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
48. Tushnet, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 952-57 (cited in note 12). 
49. Pt:abody, 16 Const. Comm. at 68-69 (cited in note 12). 
50. Peabody also takes us to task for overemphasizing the virtues of obedience to 
the wrong rule, even as Sherwin, 15 Cons!. Comm. at 68-71 (cited in note 12), chastises us 
for shying away from our conclusion and treating judicial decisions as a factor and noth-
ing stronger. Sherman does not have problems with our defense of Cooper. Her cavil is 
with our attempt to reconcile that defense with what we say about Lincoln's obligation to 
obev the command of the Court in Dred Scott. We argue that Lincoln was, or at least 
couid have been, right to disobey the Court, and that this concession docs not undermine 
our defense of Cooper. But Sherwin argues that we are then in effect only urging a con-
sideration in favor of obedience, and not a real rule, and that only a real rule can provide 
the settlement benefits of stability, reliability, and coordination. But although we agree 
with Sherwin about the necessity of a strong rule, we believe she underestimates the 
asymmetric nature of authority. The position of the authority and that of the agent sub-
ject to that authority arc different. An authority's rules claim absolute obedience, and 
not mere consideration. They demand that the subject obey even if the subject is con-
vinced that the balance of reasons, including the reasons to have the rule and its settle-
ment benefits, favors disobedience. The subject, however, faced with an authoritative 
rule, cannot alienate her rationality and moral agency, even if the overall results would 
be better if agents were to do so. There is thus always a gap between the concept of what 
the authority is right to command and what the subject is right to do. As a result, there 
appears to be no inconsistency in saying that the Court, from its perspective, was right to 
demand obedience from Lincoln, and that Lincoln, from his, was morally right to dis-
obey. 
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society. So when we claim that settlement for settlement's sake 
is the special brief of the law, we do not claim, and should not be 
understood as claiming, that all social institutions have the same 
brief as does the law, or that settlement should loom as large in 
the pantheon of social values as it properly does in that subset of 
society we call the law. To see judicial supremacy in settlement 
terms, as we do, is thus to see constitutional law as serving an es-
sentially stabilizing and constraining function. Were stability 
and constraint not preeminent among constitutional values, we 
wonder why it is seen as important in the first instance to impose 
second-order constitutional constraints on first-order political 
decisions. But if stability and constraint are central to explaining 
constitutionalism itself, then the argument for a single authorita-
tive interpreter is an argument that flows directly from the deep-
est values of constitutionalism. 
B. ARE COURTS THE BEST SETTLERS? 
Although Tushnet and Peabody challenge the value we 
place on settlement for settlement's sake, the complaint that 
joins all of our critics except Sherwin is that we leap too quickly 
from the premise that settlement for settlement's sake is a good 
thing to the conclusion that the courts in general, or the Supreme 
Court in particular, are the best institutions to serve that func-
tion. Settlement may be a good thing, these critics admit, and 
settlement may even require a single authoritative interpreter, 
but why does it follow that the assignment should be given to the 
Supreme Court rather than to some other institution? 
The argument comes in two forms. One stresses dialogue 
between the Supreme Court and Congress and between the Su-
preme Court and the executive branch. Devins and Fisher in 
particular offer a defense of a temporary form of what we dis-
miss as "institutional anarchy," arguing that a much more com-
plex give and take between the Court and the political branches 
than Cooper allows is a good thing. Such institutional anarchy 
produces better constitutional decisions in the long run, they ar-
gue, and thus to increased political stability as a consequence. 
We have not performed the full social science examination 
that would be required to address this thesis fully, and thus we 
cannot gainsay the Devins and Fisher thesis directly. To the ex-
tent that they are making the point that all authority rests fra-
gilely on acceptance by its subjects, and that the content-
independent reasons that authority provides are themselves frag-
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ile because they are deeply paradoxical, then we agree with 
them.51 
If, however, Devins and Fisher are arguing that constitu-
tional issues should not be settled authoritatively because to do 
so risks undermining the very acceptance upon which authority 
rests, then we must take issue. The public can and often does 
accept authoritative settlements, including constitutional ones, 
with which it vigorously disagrees both in terms of morality and 
policy and in terms of interpretation of text. For example, nei-
ther the early New Deal decisions by the Supreme Court invali-
datin.p federal legislation attempting to stem the Great Depres-
sion5· nor the Warren Court decision invalidating school 
prayers53 were widely viewed as lacking authority, even though 
both were extremely unpopular substantively and widely criti-
cized as interpretively erroneous. Authority may rest upon 
nothing more secure than moment to moment acceptance by 
those subject to it, but for various reasons this acceptance can 
weather a considerable amount of deep disagreement over both 
policy and interpretation. And insofar as the acceptance of the 
judicial role and the esteem of the judiciary itself may rest more 
on the substance of its decisions than anything else, 54 then it may 
also be the case that little in the structure of the Court's role will 
have a great effect on its degree of acceptance and legitimacy. 
It is also important to distinguish among various kinds of 
constitutional disagreements. When the disagreement is merely 
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of a constitutional rule 
and not with the substantive result, where people believe that 
the Supreme Court's constitutional rule is superior to the actual 
rule adopted by the framers, 55 then the case for Cooper is strong-
51. Indeed, one of us has stressed this on numerous occasions. See Larry Alexan-
der, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry of Authority?, in Linda Meyer, cd., Rules and Rea-
soning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer (Hart Publishing, 1999); Larry Alexander and 
Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1191 (1994); Larry 
Alexander, The Gap, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 695 (1991); Larry Alexander, Law and 
Exclusionary Reasons, 18 Phil. Topics 5 (1990). 
52. E.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
53. See supra note 39. 
54. See David Adamany and Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a 
National Policymaker, 5 Law & Pol'y Q. 405 (1983); Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the 
Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, SO Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 1209 (1986); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird, On 
the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 343 (1998). 
55. It may also be important not to overemphasize what the people know or believe 
about Supreme Court decisions. Cf. Timothy R. Johnson and Andrew D. Martin, The 
Public's Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 299 
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strongest. This is not to say that the Court should not attempt to 
interpret the Constitution faithfully, even when it believes the 
Constitution to be sub-optimal or even mischievous as a matter 
of morality or policy. It is merely to point out that when the 
stakes consist only of the correctness of an interpretation of an 
earlier settlement, the value of settlement appears to outweigh 
the value of interpretive correctness. 
In cases in which a Supreme Court interpretation is believed 
by the political branches to be not only incorrect but also iniqui-
tous or bad policy, should settlement then take a back seat to 
substantive correctness? From the standpoint of institutional 
design, which is the standpoint that pervades our project, we 
continue to believe that the answer is "no." Many, perhaps 
most, constitutional issues touch on matters of substantive im-
portance, so that practically all interpretive disagreements with 
the Court will be accompanied by policy disagreements. That 
means that without authoritative settlement, most constitutional 
issues will remain open in the sense that any governmental actor 
who disagrees with a Supreme Court constitutional decision will 
feel free, legally and morally even if not always politically or 
prudentially, to ignore that decision. The police officer who dis-
agrees with the prevailing state of Fourth Amendment warrant 
law will likely bypass seeking a warrant if he believes he might 
achieve his ends in doing so; and his chances of doing so will be 
enhanced if, for example, lower court judges are under no legal 
obligation to follow Supreme Court decisions with which they 
disagree. So too with state legislatures that would prefer organ-
ized prayer in the public schools, municipalities that seek to 
regulate indecency as well as obscenity, and the panoply of ex-
ecutive officials who might wish to use their powers to discour-
age women from having abortions. 
Perhaps because of examples like these, none of our critics56 
take the position that lower courts need not follow the Supreme 
Court,57 nor even the position, central to Attorney General 
Meese's claim a dozen years ago,58 that the states, whether in 
(1998) (salience of Supreme Court activity declines substantially after first decision on 
highly visible issue). 
56. With the possible exception of Hartnctt-scc Part III infra. 
57. Sec John M. Rogers. Lower Court Application of the "Overruling Law" of 
Higher Courts, I Legal Theory 179 (1995); cf. Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 155. 
58. Meese, 61 Tulane L. Rev. at 985-86 (cited in note 8); sec also Symposium, Per-
spectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 977 (1987). 
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their executive, legislative, law enforcement, or judicial capaci-
ties, were free to take Supreme Court decisions as being limited 
to the case in which they arose, and thus not setting out law for 
other actors. That our critics are unwilling to come out strongly 
in support of dispersal of the interpretive authority among the 50 
states suggests that the debate is narrower than might at first ap-
pear, and that our arguments for national interpretive suprem-
acy of the national constitution is well-accepted. Still, Devins 
and Fisher, Nagel, Peabody, and Tushnet all argue that the need 
for authoritative settlement does not dictate which institution 
should possess that authority. A democratically constituted 
body can settle constitutional issues, they argue, and thus for 
some or many issues Congress might be superior to a court in 
performing the settlement function. 
One reason for believing that the Supreme Court rather 
than Congress or the Executive is the best institution to wield 
the settlement authority, however, is the Court's relative insula-
tion from political winds, a clear virtue unless one holds the view 
that constitutional interpretation is and should be no more than 
the expression of contemporary values and policies. And al-
though Nagel, especially, charges us with exaggerating the de-
gree of Supreme Court stability,59 the question of stability can 
only be determined by a function that takes into account both 
the frequency and the degree of variability. Just as house cur-
rent that moves constantly in a range between 108 and 112 volts 
is for most purposes more stable than current that is between 
109.9 and 110.1 six days out of seven and either 62 or 154 on the 
seventh day, so too is it a mistake to focus on Supreme Court in-
stability without examining the range within which the Supreme 
Court is unstable as compared to the range within which the 
other branches would be unstable. And if Supreme Court insta-
bility takes place frequently but within a narrow range,60 it is a 
mistake to focus only on the number of changes in Supreme 
Court doctrine, as Nagel appears to do, without careful examina-
tion of the range of this variation compared to the range of 
variation for the other branches. 
Our suspicion, which admittedly would be better bolstered 
by the kind of careful controlled examination that neither we nor 
our critics have yet performed, is consistent with the view that 
59. Nagel, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 857-60 (cited in note 12). 
60. See Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't 
(Yale U. Press, 1983). 
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the Court's adherence to precedent61 allows it to settle constitu-
tional issues more permanently than can the political branches, 
which have no practice analogous to precedential constraint. 
But even if t~e b~st institutiona~ design would exemgt the Court 
from the obhgatwn to follow tts own precedents, - the Court 
would still be superior to the political branches as the institution 
to exercise the settlement authority. There are established and 
constraining procedures through which constitutional issues are 
brought before the court, but no comparable procedures exist 
for bringing such issues before the political branches. The Court 
issues opinions along with its decisions, but the political branches 
do not (although they could). The Court has only nine mem-
bers, and they serve for life. The Court cannot pick its agenda, 
although Congress can. Whether in the final empirical analysis 
these and other features make the Court more stable than Con-
gress or more stable than the executive branch is more of an em-
pirical question than we first acknowledged, but in default of the 
61. See Antonin Scalia, A Mauer of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 138-
39 (Princeton U. Press, 1997); Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law at 82-85 (cited in 
note 9); Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. 
Rev. 723 (1988). 
62. Should the Supreme Court itself be subject to the Cooper rule'' Put differently, 
should a decision by the Court that it now believes to be mistaken nonetheless be taken 
as having permanently settled the issue'1 How strong a doctrine of horizontal precedent 
should apply to the Court's constitutional decisions'' 
There are three principal positions one can take on this matter. First, one can argue 
that the Cooper rule should apply full force to the Court itself. Once the Court decides a 
constitutional matter, it is settled for all time. No matter how mistaken a constitutional 
interpretation the Court now believes its earlier decision to have been, and no matter 
how mischievous or iniquitous, the earlier decision is as authoritative as the Constitution 
for the Court as well as all other officials. 
The second position is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The Court might be the 
one institution exempt from the Cooper rule. If it believes an earlier constitutional 
precedent to have been mistaken, it is free to overrule it. 
The third position would allow the Court to overrule precedents only if the prece-
dents were both erroneous as constitutional interpretations and, in the Court's opinion, 
unjust or mischievous. In other words, constitutional error would be a necessary but not 
sufficient ground for overruling precedent. 
The first position exalts settlement over all opposing values. The Court gets one 
shot at correctly interpreting particular constitutional provisions. The only cure for Su-
preme Court error would be the lengthy and difficult course of constitutional amend-
ment. 
The second position, however, does not prize settlement enough. We are attracted, 
therefore, to some variant of the third position, which gives the Court a safety valve 
against harmful constitutional errors. Of course, the third position has its downsides. 
Unlike the other positions, in which the Court must follow the Framers or follow its prior 
decisions attempting to follow the Framers, the third position requires the Court to make 
first-order judgments of morality and policy. Moreover, it sacrifices somc settlement 
value and also allows some constitutional error. For these reasons, our endorsement of 
the third position is less than wholehearted and quite tentative. 
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kind of non-anecdotal evidence that would approach settlement 
of this question, we remain unpersuaded that, if settlement is a 
substantial goal, that we will get more settlement for settlement's 
sake from Congress than we will get from the Supreme Court. 
III. WHAT IS THE SUPREME COURT FOR? 
Undergirding many of the criticisms is a vision of the Su-
preme Court as a case-decider and not a law-maker. This vision, 
consistent with a classical view about the functions of the courts 
but not necessarily invalid because of that provenance, is most 
explicit in Hartnett's critique, for to him what courts do is decide 
specific cases.63 All the rest, including the opinions, is gravy. 
For Hartnett the decision of cases, and not the giving of opin-
ions, is at the core of the judicial function, and since our whole 
position rests on the way in which opinions might be thought to 
give some guidance, it rests on a misunderstanding, he argues, of 
the nature of adjudication. And, Hartnett supports his view with 
an impressive demonstration of the historical view that the Su-
preme Court was from the founding conceived as a case-decider 
and not as a law-maker or opinion-giver. 
We will not dispute Hartnett's history, but as with Devins 
and Fisher's history, we have a different view about the status of 
that history. So if we take the history as interesting but not de-
terminative, we might then ask about what vision of what the 
Court should be doing is most consistent with our view of the 
settlement function. And here we admit that we do not find it 
irrelevant that last year the Supreme Court carefully considered, 
by its own definition of careful consideration implicitly built into 
the certiorari process and procedures, only 94 cases, as compared 
with the 7015 it was asked to carefully consider, but chose not 
to.64 If the Supreme Court is primarily a case-decider and only 
secondarily, at best, an opinion purveyor, it _appears to have 
achieved a level of inefficiency unmatched in any other govern-
63. Sec Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 126-36, 146-58 (cited in note 12). A similar 
claim makes a brief appearance in Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note 
12). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to 
Professor Paulsen, 83 Geo. L.J. 347,349 (1994) (federal courts decide cases and do not 
expound the law); Thomas Merrill, Judicial OpinioiiS as Binding Law and as Explana-
tions for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 43 (1993); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the 
Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1006 (1965) (Supreme Court functions stem from 
its responsibility to decide concrete cases). 
64. The Supreme Court, 1998 Term - The Statistics, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 400, 407 
(1999). 
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ment agency we know of.65 If the Supreme Court processes only 
1% of its caseload in order that it might make good decisions in 
that 1%, and in order that it might surround those decisions with 
opinions that, according to Hartnett and others, do not much 
matter, the time has come for major reconsideration of the 
Court's role and its methods of operation. 
Such reconsideration might be in order, we believe, but not 
because the Court is doing too much opinion-writing. On the 
contrary, on our view it is not doing enough, or it is not doing it 
well enough.66 The vision of the Court as constitutional inter-
preter, which is our vision, as opposed to the vision of the Court 
as dispute settler, which is Hartnett's, is a vision that sees the 
Court being much more concerned with instructing, guiding, 
helping, and, indeed, ordering other bodies and other branches 
than the volume and style of its current output would suggest.67 
And if these are or should be the Court's concerns, then we 
would expect to see more clear rules, fewer divided judgments 
without a majority opinion, more concern by the Justices for the 
Court speaking with a single voice than with making their own 
points or even with insisting on their own view about the out-
come,68 even more concern with stare decisis, and in general 
more Supreme Court behavior befitting the law-maker that the 
Supreme Court undeniably is, and in our judgment inevitably 
must be. The strongest argument for Hartnett's position is not 
65. Samuel Estreichcr and John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681 (1984), argue that 
the Supreme Court should sec itself more than it docs as a manager of a system of courts. 
We do not disagree with this, but offer the more radical proposal that the Court should 
also see itself as a manager of constitutional signals and a manager of a system of consti-
tutional compliance. 
66. Sec Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 
807-11 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1455 (1995). 
67. Our view is largely consistent with that in David G. Post and Steven C. Salop, 
Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers 
and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1069 (1996). See also Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence 
G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1 
(1993); David G. Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of 
Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 Geo. L.J. 743 (1992). On these and related issues, see 
generally Evan H. Caminkcr, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember 
Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297 (1999). 
68. Sec John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Re· 
sponse to Some Radical Proposals, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996); John M. Rogers, "I Vote 
This Way Because I'm Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439 
(1990). In ultimately agreeing with our position about Cooper, Suzanna Sherry takes our 
position, correctly, as suggesting that individual Justices of the Court should take them-
selves in many contexts (such as that presented in City of Boerne) as being as bound by 
the Court's decisions as they expect other officials to be. Sherry, 39 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 
at 904 (cited in note 13). 
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his historical analysis, which again we believe correct but largely 
beside the point. Rather, it is the nature of the Court's current 
performance as rule-maker. If the authoritative interpretation 
of authoritative rules is a rule-making function, which we believe 
it is, then much of the Court's methods of operation would need 
to be revamped.69 In that sense, Hartnett's most persuasive 
claim, even if not one he makes explicitly, is that under his vision 
the Court can proceed as it is now, and under our vision it needs 
to spend much more time thinking about how it can give better 
guidance to Congress, to the executive, to lower courts, and to 
the states. 70 
We have dismissed as being no more relevant than original 
intent the Court's own assertions of its own interpretive suprem-
acy, arguing that this form of bootstrapping could not answer the 
question of whether the Court's assertions of interpretive su-
premacy should be respected by other branches, and supported 
by extra-judicial political incentives. 71 But in another sense the 
Court's own assertions are highly relevant. If the Court itself 
purports to be a guider of other officials and other branches, 
which is what its own statements in Cooper and City of Boerne 
appear to assert, then the Court's performance may properly be 
69. We do not accept Hartnett's view that the courts "have little business decree-
ing" rules. Hartnett, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 149 (cited in note 12). Nor do we agree with 
him that an opinion (a reason) cannot be followed. As a statement of what should hap-
pen in a class of cases, of which the instant case is one, a reason is essentially a rule, sec 
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633 (1995), and can be followed just 
as a rule can be followed. "I hold in your favor because people have a right to protest in 
public parks" is a reason, but it is also a rule that protesting in public parks must be per-
mitted. For us, the Supreme Court decrees rules whenever it gives a reason for its deci-
sion, and thus whenever it writes an opinion. To suggest that the Court should get out of 
this business is truly the radical approach, and our more modest suggestion is only that 
the Court acknowledge the rule-making in which it is inevitably engaged, as a first step 
towards doing better what it is now doing, and has been doing for centuries. 
70. This might also be an argument, were we starting anew, for a much less opaque 
constitutional text. Although the new 114-page Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa and the new 211-page Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil might be 
extreme examples, it is instructive that in all of the constitution-making now going on 
throughout the world, no nation has chosen a written constitution anywhere as brief and 
cryptic as that of the Constitution of the United States. Much of this is likely due to the 
fact that the Constitution of the United States was made in secret and most modern ones, 
and especially the two we just noted, were made under very public conditions in which 
the political incentives favored wholesale inclusion of a wide variety of rights, interests, 
and values. But part of it may also be due to an increased recognition that if a Constitu-
tion is to serve as law, then it should come as no surprise that it will look like law as well. 
71. Such as political liabilities for elected officials who disregarded even unpopular 
Supreme Court decisions, liabilities that plainly do not exist in the current political envi-
ronment in which elected officials and their subordinates operate. 
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measured against its own announced statement of its function. 72 
And by the definition of the function that it has announced and 
we, here and earlier, have supported, the Court plainly has a 
long way to go. 
It may appear that imagining this role for the Court runs 
afoul of the prohibition on advisory opinions,73 but if the ban on 
advisory opinions were understood as preventing useful state-
ments about the law unnecessary to the result in the case the 
Court would do nothing except announce judgments, possibly-
and only possibly-coupled with a statement of the facts of the 
case. Once the Court goes beyond this, whether we call what the 
Court does giving an opinion, giving reasons, or offering dicta, it 
is in the business of giving advisory opinions. There may be 
good Article III reasons for prohibiting the Court from doinfi 
this except in the context of a particular case or controversy, 
but once a case or controversy exists it is too late in the day to 
eliminate the full array of reason-giving practices in which the 
Court is engaged, practices that necessarily "decide" cases other 
than the one before the Court because the logical nature of a 
reason makes it broader than the outcome that the reason is a 
reason for. So if the Court is already and necessarily in the busi-
ness of giving advice in its opinions-advisory opinions-then it 
is only the smallest of steps to imagine that it could consider 
more seriously than it has to date how it might perform this func-
tion more effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
It is fashionable to dismiss John Marshall's claim that the 
province of the judiciary is "to say what the law is"75 as typical 
Marshallian hubris,76 unnecessary to the result in Marbury, un-
72. For an important exploration of the ways in which courts might serve this func-
tion more effectively, sec Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constiwtional Flares: On Judges, 
Legisla!Ures, and Dialogue, 83 Minn. L. Rev. I (1998). 
73. Sec Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article Ill, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997 (1994); 
Oliver P. Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 Ind. L.J. 203 (1949); Felix 
Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002 (1924). A useful sur-
vey of state practices is Paul C. Clovis and Clarence M. Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13 
Iowa L. Rev. 188 (1928). 
74. See Krotoszynski, 83 Minn. L. Rev. at 19-23, 30-39 (cited in note 72); Evan T. 
Lee, Deconstitutiona/izing Justiciability: The Example of Moot ness, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 605 
(1992). 
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,177 (1803). 
76. Cf. Nagel, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 850 (cited in note 12) (describing judicial 
assertions of interpretive supremacy as exercises in "self-importance"). 
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supported by the Constitution, and unwise as a matter of policy. 
Yet if a multiplicity of bodies says what the law is, then there is 
likely to be a multiplicity of laws, or, more precisely, a multiplic-
ity of interpretations of the same law. And if, as Lon Fuller 
maintained, knowing what the law is and knowing how to corn-
ply are necessary conditions for legality itself,77 then multifarious 
law and multifarious interpretation are at odds with the rule of 
law itself. Although diversity of opinion is a valuable social phe-
nomenon, law exists primarily because diversity of opinion and 
diversity of action may sometimes produce more harm than 
good. When we value coordination and settlement more than 
we value diversity, we employ law, and John Marshall's claim is 
nothing less than the observation, later refined by Fuller, that 
without a single and authoritative interpreter there would be lit-
tle difference between law and the numerous non-enforced di-
rectives we find in philosophy books and advice columns. 
As a judge, Marshall not surprisingly moved too quickly 
from the need for a single authoritative interpreter to the claim 
that the judiciary was the only institution that could serve this 
role. But although there are other candidates, none of them 
contain the institutional constraints that could enable them to 
speak with the same degree of consistency as the Supreme 
Court. As long as this is so, and there is no evidence that it is 
not,78 then it will and should be the function of the Supreme 
Court to say what the law is. For those arguing to the Supreme 
Court or evaluating its work, there will always remain some con-
ceptual space between what the Supreme Court says and the law 
the Court purports to interpret. For those to whom the Supreme 
Court speaks, however, the functions of law have been better 
served, and will be better served in the future, if the Constitution 
is what the Supreme Court says it is. 
77. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1969). 
78. One of the most valuable products of this exchange between us and our critics, 
we hope and believe, is that it has sharpened the nature of the empirical question that 
lies at the center of the debate, at least at the center of the debate between us and those 
who would locate in Congress the role of the single authoritative interpreter. As Pea-
body properly observes, Peabody, 16 Const. Comm. at 85-90 (cited in note 12), the de-
bate may provide the springboard for the kind of serious empirical research on this ques-
tion that has yet to take place. 
